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Cristina Nenciu-Posner,4 Anna Lorant,1 Radu Ionescu,4 and Anthony Patt2
In light of increasing losses from floods, many researchers and policymakers are look-
ing for ways to encourage flood risk reduction among communities, business, and house-
holds. In this study, we investigate risk-reduction behavior at the household level in three
European Union Member States with fundamentally different insurance and compensation
schemes. We try to understand if and how insurance and public assistance influence private
risk-reduction behavior. Data were collected using a telephone survey (n = 1,849) of house-
hold decisionmakers in flood-prone areas. We show that insurance overall is positively asso-
ciated with private risk-reduction behavior. Warranties, premium discounts, and information
provision with respect to risk reduction may be an explanation for this positive relationship
in the case of structural measures. Public incentives for risk-reduction measures by means of
financial and in-kind support, and particularly through the provision of information, are also
associated with enhancing risk reduction. In this study, public compensation is not negatively
associated with private risk-reduction behavior. This does not disprove such a relationship,
but the negative effect may be mitigated by factors related to respondents’ capacity to imple-
ment measures or social norms that were not included in the analysis. The data suggest that
large-scale flood protection infrastructure creates a sense of security that is associated with
a lower level of preparedness. Across the board there is ample room to improve both public
and private policies to provide effective incentives for household-level risk reduction.
KEY WORDS: Climate change adaptation; flood insurance; moral hazard; public incentive; risk
reduction
1. INTRODUCTION
Floods are the most devastating disasters glob-
ally, accounting for 43% of all recorded natural disas-
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ters between 1994 and 2013. In this period, floods af-
fected almost 2.5 million people, causing more dam-
age to infrastructure than any other natural hazard,
andUSD 636 billion of economic losses worldwide.(1)
This is due mainly to an accumulation of assets in
flood-prone areas.(1) Reducing losses and damages
from floods and other natural disasters is thus of ut-
most importance “to enhance the economic, social,
health, and cultural resilience of persons, communi-
ties, countries, and their assets.”(2) However, despite
evidence of their high economic returns, public and
private stakeholders throughout the world fail to im-
plement sufficient risk-reduction measures.(2)
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To date, research has focused mainly on the
cognitive drivers of risk-reduction behavior, most
importantly on factors such as risk perception, risk
attitudes, previous experience, and socioeconomic
factors. More recently, researchers designed protec-
tion motivation theory to include coping capacity
as an important explanation.(3,4) Reviews of these
drivers show how in comparison institutional drivers
are less broadly covered.(5,6) With the increasing
relevance of public and private institutions in design-
ing comprehensive risk management strategies, the
potential to foster household-level risk reduction,
but also to inadvertently discourage it, is becoming
increasingly relevant.
Much of the ongoing discussion on insurance re-
form focuses on the argument that moving from un-
differentiated to risk-based insurance schemes will
further risk reduction.(7–11) If premiums reflect the
actual risk in terms of hazard, exposure, and vulnera-
bility, i.e., locating in lower-risk areas means lower
premiums, and if private risk-reduction measures
were to be rewarded by reduced premiums, over-
all risk reduction could be encouraged and poten-
tial effects of moral hazard would be reduced. Moral
hazard, assuming asymmetric information, refers to
policyholders’ low willingness to implement risk-
reduction measures or even relocate out of flood-
prone areas when expecting insurance payouts. The
same claim is made for public postdisaster assis-
tance and compensation schemes, which in this nar-
rative crowd out insurance and reduce private risk-
reduction behavior,(12–14) sometimes referred to as
charity hazard. Despite arguments for reducing pub-
lic disaster assistance in favor of risk-based insurance
programs, no country in Europe can claim full risk-
based insurance pricing, and many countries, includ-
ing the Netherlands, Austria, and the United King-
dom, have experienced difficulties in implementing
reforms in this direction.(15) At the same time, in only
a few countries do citizens rely exclusively on public
ex post assistance.
In this study, we investigate how existing insur-
ance programs and public assistance architectures
are associated with risk reduction at the household
level. We compare Austria, Romania, and England,
each with fundamentally different risk management
approaches. In Austria, ex post public compensation
has been institutionalized for two decades, unlike in
England where people can only rely on market in-
surance. Romania is the only selected country where
disaster insurance is mandatory, but the communist
legacy of government responsibility for flood risk is
difficult to cast off and market penetration for insur-
ance remains low (see also Section 3). Our findings
are crucial for identifying whether and how risk man-
agement schemes can be usefully redesigned in order
to better foster risk-reduction behavior at the house-
hold level.
2. BACKGROUND
In light of the complex drivers of human be-
havior, research on private risk reduction, including
flood preparedness and risk reduction, has increased
considerably over the past two decades. This also
applies to the context of disaster preparedness and
risk reduction in general and to flood risk in par-
ticular. Comprehensive literature reviews have illus-
trated the importance of risk perception, past experi-
ence, risk attitudes, and coping capacity, although the
direction of any associations may vary across stud-
ies, depending on contextual factors and research
design.(5,6) Incentives from private and/or public in-
surance and other government risk management ef-
forts feature less prominently, but receive increasing
attention. This section summarizes existing literature
on theoretical reasoning and empirical findings of in-
centive mechanisms for risk-reduction behavior.
In the absence of appropriate incentives, eco-
nomic theory states that insurance may lead to moral
hazard. Stiglitz described the fundamental conflict of
moral hazard as “the more and better insurance is
provided against some contingency, the less incen-
tive individuals have to avoid the insured event, be-
cause the less they bear the full consequence of their
actions.”(16) Economic theory on pure moral hazard
suggests that risk-based pricing is impossible or un-
feasible due to high transaction costs, but moral haz-
ard should be counteracted by means of deductibles
and indemnity limits, i.e., not fully insuring risk, and
thereby setting an incentive. It also states that any
government insurance not specifying risk-reduction
measures is detrimental to market efficiency.(16)
The problem of moral hazard also applies
to postdisaster public aid and compensation, also
known as the Samaritan’s dilemma,(17) referring to
a situation where beneficiaries expecting aid have
less incentive to improve their own situation by re-
ducing their risk, but rely on external compensation.
For natural disasters, Browne and Hoyt(18) substi-
tute the term “Samaritan’s dilemma” with charity
hazard to denominate a crowding-out effect of pub-
lic ex post compensation on insurance. Raschky and
Weck-Hannemann as well as Deryugina and Barrett
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expand the definition to include risk mitigation ef-
forts on behalf of the potential recipient.(19,20)
At the same time, there is limited evidence on
which mechanisms insurers use in practice that can
be associated with risk reduction. Lorant et al. list
those incentive mechanisms available to insurers: in-
surance limits and deductibles, i.e., the part of an in-
surance claim to be paid by the insured; warranties,
i.e., terms and situations when an insurance policy
applies; risk engineering, referring to direct support
determining suitable risk-reduction measures; and
awareness raising and persuasion by means of in-
formation sharing. While these measures are effec-
tive in theory, the practice falls far short of their
potential.(21) Indeed, empirical evidence on success-
ful risk-based pricing is scarce. While insurers in-
creasingly implement partially risk-based premiums
using improved hazard risk mapping, they rarely in-
clude warranties, or provide premium or deductible
discounts, for the implementation of risk-reduction
measures.(15) In Germany, for example, where insur-
ance premiums are calculated based on risk zones,
mitigation behavior in insured households is slightly
higher compared to uninsured households.(22) One
reason may be that some German insurers attach
warranties for backflow valves to their policies.(23)
In the French NatCat system, insurers’ incentives
are positively associated with risk-reduction mea-
sures taken by households. However, information
provided by insurers was not associated with risk-
reducing behavior.(5) Despite this limited evidence
for incentive mechanisms from insurers, particularly
studies for Germany find no evidence for the exis-
tence of moral hazard in practice.(22–24)
Several studies, however, provide empirical
evidence for the existence of charity hazard based
on respondents’ intention to purchase insurance
and/or implement other risk-reduction measures,
if compensation could be expected. Raschky et al.,
using stated preference, found that in the Austrian
province of Tyrol even partial public ex post com-
pensation discouraged the willingness to pay for
insurance policies.(13) Similar results are available
for Taiwan,(14) England and Wales,(25) and the
Netherlands.(26) These studies, however, do not
provide evidence whether charity hazard in practice
is salient enough to outweigh other drivers of risk
reduction.
Governments have a range of tools at their dis-
posal that may encourage private risk reduction.
These can be regulatory, such as building codes; fi-
nancial, such as subsidies, tax breaks, or loans for
risk-reduction measures; the provision of in-kind as-
sistance, such as mobile barriers; and the provision
of information about risks and risk-reduction mea-
sures. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
such measures is increasingly available, but not al-
ways decisive. Poussin et al. found that people in
the French NatCat insurance system who looked
for government-provided information on flood pro-
tection implemented more structural and avoid-
ance measures.(5,27) “Incentives from the munici-
pality” were positively associated with the number
of preparedness measures, as well as with the in-
tention to take measures in the future. Also, in-
formation provided by local authorities and insur-
ers was found to play a significant role. This is
in line with findings from Thieken et al. and Sims
and Baumann in their case studies for Germany(28)
and the United States,(29) where information did
affect risk-reduction behavior positively. Contradict-
ing these findings, Miceli et al. found that commu-
nication by public authorities in Italian communi-
ties had no influence on households’ risk-reduction
behavior.(30) Similarly so, Osberghaus and Philippi
report that provincial campaigns for disaster risk
reduction did not influence household behavior.(23)
Several authors highlight the positive impact of
building codes.(7,31,32) Findings are not uniform, how-
ever, as others find no impact of building codes on
risk-reduction behavior.(27)
Generally, governments focus more on large-
scale flood protection opportunities than on incen-
tivizing private risk-reduction behavior. Keating et al.
highlight how the levee effect may result from the
public provision of flood protection infrastructure
without considering human, social, and environmen-
tal dynamics:(33,34) the main purpose of a levee is to
protect against flooding, and at the same time it may
create a false sense of security, increasing develop-
ment and thus exposure of people and assets in its
catchment. When the levee fails, the disaster will be
much bigger as more is at stake and people are less
prepared.(34–37) This has been documented in Ger-
many and Austria as contributing to the extent of
losses in the 2013 floods.(38)
Ultimately, a growing discourse shows how in-
surance and assistance schemes could contribute to
enhancing risk reduction, but little knowledge ex-
ists on how unstylized design features pan out in re-
ality. This is where we see the contribution of this
study. Since practices vary not only across countries,
but also across individual insurers and local jurisdic-
tional levels, a bottom-up perspective is useful to gain
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further insight on the risk-reduction behavior of
households in the light of different public and pri-
vate (dis-)incentives from insurance, ex post compen-
sation, ex ante assistance, and public flood protection
infrastructure.
3. INSTITUTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF
COUNTRY CASES
The three selected European case study
countries—Austria, Romania, and England—have
strongly differentiated risk compensation and
insurance systems. We describe each, in turn.
Austria is one of the few countries that pro-
vides institutionalized ex post compensation for dis-
aster losses to its residents. The national budget
includes a catastrophe fund (Katastrophenfonds)
capitalized from income, capital yields, and corpo-
rate income taxes. The fund is primarily used to fi-
nance large-scale protection infrastructure (ex ante
risk management), but also serves to compensate pri-
vate households for damages from natural catastro-
phes, among which floods feature most prominently.
Disbursements from the fund are matched at the
provincial level, which also distributes the payouts
based on provincial rules. Typically, the fund com-
pensates losses above EUR 1,000, and up to 20–50%
of damages, with exceptions for cases of extreme dis-
tress, in which up to 100% of damages have been
refunded. Flood victims are not legally entitled to
compensation from the fund. Often, insured losses
are exempt from compensation, which is a disincen-
tive for purchasing insurance, contributing to low
flood insurance market penetration.
Flood insurance in Austria is available from the
private market, although often denied for properties
in high-risk areas. Recently, it has becomemore com-
mon to include coverage for natural catastrophes, in-
cluding floods, in homeowners’ property insurance
contracts. Most policies have indemnity limits of only
a few thousand Euros,(39) although extension of cov-
erage may be possible. This recently introduced cov-
erage, which often is not optional, makes it difficult
to assess market penetration, previously reported as
being low at 10–25%.(40)
England, in stark contrast to Austria, relies on
private insurance with a market penetration of over
75%.(41) This high penetration rate is in part due
to homeowners being obliged to purchase flood in-
surance as a condition for a mortgage. The British
government is not legally bound to provide ex post
compensation for disaster damages, and there is no
tradition of providing ad hoc aid on a significant
scale.
Until recently, England relied on a “gentlemen’s
agreement” between insurers and the government,
by which insurance was offered at affordable premi-
ums for the entire population at flood risk, as long
as the government provided flood protection infras-
tructure in those same areas. According to the in-
surance industry, this agreement was insufficiently
adhered to by the government, and thus a compre-
hensive reform effort was initiated in 2014.(42) In-
surers are increasingly setting their premiums par-
tially on risk, by differentiating premiums according
to postal zones. However, this is not directly commu-
nicated to consumers. Some insurers set or increase
deductibles after a property has suffered from flood
damage.
Romania’s communist history creates a special
case for this study. The state played a very paternal
role in providing comprehensive flood protection
infrastructure between 1960 and 1990, with the
overall aim to eliminate all major flood risk. These
exclusively technical solutions (i.e., canals, levees,
pumping stations, etc.) are today often considered
maladaptations, as they negatively influence river
ecosystems and have even increased flood intensity,
for example, along the Danube.(43,44) At the same
time, flood insurance was compulsory, especially
for agricultural areas. After this system was abol-
ished, due to unclear regulations, the government
occasionally paid relief to flood victims.
Romania introduced a compulsory insurance
system with law nr. 260/2008 and law 191/2015.
This scheme, backed by a national insurance pool
(PAID), obliges all Romanian citizens to purchase
bundled multihazard insurance, with the option of
cover for either EUR 10,000 or EUR 20,000, depend-
ing on the quality of the building. Thus, premiums de-
pend only on the construction type and, quite excep-
tionally, not on hazard probability or exposure. This
law also states that no compensation will be paid to
uninsured households.(45) Market penetration in the
new scheme reached 18% in mid 2015, with higher
penetration rates in urban than in rural areas.(46,47)
This low penetration despite the compulsory nature
of the system reflects difficulties to enforce the law,
particularly in rural areas. Armas¸ et al. found the lack
of insurance uptake to be related to a lack of trust
in insurers as well as missing information on how to
buy insurance.(43) We only have anecdotal evidence
for other reasons explaining the low penetration rate.
For example, the fact that people in rural areas often
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have difficulties proving the ownership of their home,
which is a prerequisite for buying insurance.
All three countries have publicly accessible flood
risk maps available online, and flood risk manage-
ment plans in the final stages of preparation in line
with E.U. regulations. With the exception of the
province of Lower Austria, the countries lack build-
ing codes that prescribe risk-reduction measures.
Even in the case of Lower Austria, the regulations
regard only one measure, mandating that floor lev-
els be raised above certain flood levels. Emerging
regulation and guidance on new developments and
drainage in England are unlikely to influence the out-
come of this study.
4. METHOD
4.1. Sampling and Data Collection
Data were collected by a professional survey
company (IMAS), which conducted 1,849 computer-
assisted telephone interviews (CATI) in flood risk ar-
eas in Austria (600), England (600), and Romania
(649) among the voting-age population. In order to
reduce the probability of rented homes in the sample,
the focus was on rural communities, assuming that
rural residents have higher home ownership and that
renters tend to be less aware and take less action in
relation to risk mitigation than homeowners.(4,28,48)
The sampling process for flood risk studies is
complicated, as flood risk areas usually do not cor-
respond with administrative entities, and data pro-
tection laws do not allow us to determine the ad-
dresses of respondents and thus the identification
of objective flood risk for each household. Data
on flood risk areas are also not harmonized across
countries, and require different criteria for deter-
mining the sample. We selected communities using
the public flood risk information available in each
of the three countries. For Austria, we used the
flood risk zones provided by the public online tool
HORA in combination with APSFR (Areas of Po-
tential Significant Flood Risk) information provided
by the provinces for setting up the E.U.-mandated
flood risk management plans. The sample frame in-
cluded all postal codes where at least 30% of ad-
dresses are in flood-risk areas, and where, accord-
ing to the APSFR, 500–5,000 inhabitants have been
affected at least by a 100-year flood. We selected
postal codes for the provinces of Vorarlberg, Ty-
rol, Salzburg, Lower Austria, and Burgenland. For
England, we selected communities based on the
National Flood Risk Assessment 2011.(49) The sam-
ple frame is limited to postal codes fulfilling the fol-
lowing conditions: (1) 80% of residential properties
are at high (up to 1 in 30 chance) or medium (up to
1 in a 100 chance) flood risk; (2) less than 40% of
homes are rented; and (3) the most recent floods in
the respective post district occurred after 2000. For
Romania, we selected communities directly from the
interactive flood risk and hazard map of Romania,(50)
activating the flood risk layer for 1 in 10 year events
in order to identify communities that include areas of
high flood risk.
4.2. Questionnaire Design and Sample Description
In designing the questionnaire, we took into ac-
count recent studies on flood risk. Qualitative in-
terviews with experts and stakeholders in Austria,
England, and Romania served as a first reference for
determining content standards. The questionnaire
master was developed in English and then translated
to German and Romanian. It was tested for cogni-
tive and usability standards as well as duration in a
small subset of informal interviews and a pretest of
25 interviews. Overall, the questionnaire consisted
of both closed and open-ended questions. The in-
terviews were conducted in July and August 2015.
In terms of response rate, the number of contact
attempts in order to complete one successful inter-
view was 44 in Austria, 40 in Romania, and 11 in
England. This stark difference resulted in part from
the different sampling approaches used. Interviews
took an average of 16 minutes; this included ques-
tions for other purposes than this analysis.
We included two preselection questions at the
beginning of the questionnaire, inquiring about the
perceived level of flood risk on a five-point scale and
about the decision-making capacity of the respon-
dent (Table S2, Supporting Information), aborting
interviews where respondents reported no flood risk,
or no decision-making competences. Although the
unit of analysis is the household, we acknowledge
that questions relating to perceptions are tied to in-
dividual respondents. For this analysis, we assumed
that perceptions and opinions are shared across the
household. We thus use household and respondents
as being semantically appropriate in the text, but re-
ferring to the same unit of analysis.
Table I lists the median age of the sample
population as 57 years and thus above the national
median age of each country, although less so in
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Table I. Median Age and Gender Balance for Each Sample
Region Compared to National Numbers(51)
Median Age (Years)
Gender (Women per
100 Men)
Sample Country Sample Country
Austria 56 42.9 121 104.7
Romania 59 40.8 163 103.2
England 54.5 39.9 (U.K.) 127 104.7 (U.K.)
Total 57 – 137 –
England and Austria than in Romania. This may be
because our sample frame was mostly restricted to
rural areas, where the population is on average older
than in urban areas. Interviewing times, although
covering weekends, mornings, and evenings as well
as throughout the day, may lead to older people and
women being overrepresented. Finally, women are
generally more likely to respond to phone surveys
than men,(55) which may account for some of the
gender bias in our sample compared to national
distribution of sex.
We collected information on income using
country-specific categories for the monthly net
household income. In order to achieve some kind
of comparability, we created income groups with
the categories low, middle, and high, where middle
includes those two income categories closest to the
national mean household income as reported by EU-
ROSTAT for 2015. This shows that higher-income
households are overrepresented compared to low-
income households, which may again be explained
by homeowners being the main target of this survey.
The largest proportion of the sample population
in each country state high school and technical or vo-
cational training as their highest complete level of ed-
ucation. The Austrian subsample has a lower num-
ber of university graduates, but a high number of
respondents who had completed technical or voca-
tional training compared to England and Romania.
4.3. Analytical Framework
For the purpose of identifying ways insur-
ance and public assistance efforts may be asso-
ciated with household risk-reduction behavior, we
explored the variables shown in Fig. 1. Our an-
alytical framework is inspired by Poussin et al.,
who expanded protection motivation theory for ad-
ditional variables that had been identified in the
literature as potentially relevant drivers of private
risk-reduction behavior.(5) We collected information
on risk-reduction behavior as the outcome variable
differentiated for structural (SMs) as well as avoid-
ance and preparedness measures (APMs). SMs are
often costlier and more complicated to implement
than APMs; some may only be implemented when
building a house, such as using flood-resistant ma-
terials for foundations; others may need expensive
retrofitting, such as fitting new waterproof windows,
or moving wiring or piping. Only a few SMs are
comparably inexpensive, such as installing a pump
and/or backflow valves. APMs, such as emergency
plans, moving expensive appliances, and keeping
sandbags ready, are considerably less expensive and
usually easier to implement. Indeed, they do not re-
quire structural changes, and less advance prepara-
tion. Unlike many other studies, we did not prede-
fine measures or categories of measures. We account
only for measures respondents took explicitly as SMs
or APMs in order to avoid two kinds of bias: (1) fo-
cus on a predetermined set of measures, or toward
measures people feel they should have taken; and (2)
we avoid missing measures that are specific to a cer-
tain area due to certain landscape features or cultural
heritage. We acknowledge that this approach might
to some extent underrepresent the actual number of
measures implemented. It also may create a bias due
to systematically different capabilities to remember
the implementation of the measures. Respondents
dealing more frequently with floods may more eas-
ily recall the measures implemented than others who
have installed the same measures based on a recom-
mendation, but have no experience with floods.
The predictor variables are (1) the availability
of public ex post relief, which should negatively
influence risk-reduction behavior in the case of
Austria. We were only able to assess this by means
of a country dummy variable. This is insufficient
to prove or disprove charity hazard as the scope
of our study does not allow us to control for other
important factors that may systematically differ
across countries. Also, in practice we rarely find an
ideal setup to test charity hazard. In Austria, relief
payments are not covering 100% of damages and are
not legally binding. Moreover, at least some level
of insurance is available for most households. Thus,
it will be impossible to dissect any actual charity
hazard. The only conclusion we may infer is about
whether any disincentive will manifest in less risk-
reduction measures taken by Austrian compared to
Romanian and English households, despite other
drivers not explicitly included. (2) Public measures at
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Fig. 1. Dependent and independent variables and their assumed positive and/or negative associations. Thick lines indicate the main vari-
ables. The thinner solid lines indicate the control variables, whereas the thin dotted lines highlight relevant variables that we were not able
to address in the regression model.
the municipal, provincial, and national scales, such as
financial and in-kind assistance (e.g., sand bags) or
the provision of information, which can be associated
positively with risk-reduction behavior. (3) Being
insured for investigating whether insured households
tend to implement less risk-reduction measures be-
cause of moral hazard should be more visible in the
case of England and Romania, where indemnity lim-
its are considerably higher than in Austria. (4) In the
case of insurance, we also try to dissect any associa-
tions of deductibles, warranties, and whether respon-
dents have received information on risk-reduction
measures from insurers. (5) We include the extent to
which households feel protected by large-scale flood
protection infrastructure, which we assume will be
negatively associated with risk-reduction behavior.
We control for the anticipated positive effects of
(6) previous flood experience, and (7) perceived
likelihood of flood damages in the next 10 years.
Finally, we control for socioeconomic variables
household income and highest level of education,
demographic variables income and gender, and in
the case of SMs, for ownership. We did this under the
assumption that most APMs may be also in the inter-
est of renters, whereas SMs are mostly relevant for
homeowners.
The dotted box indicates other relevant vari-
ables, including social norms, coping capacity, and
risk attitudes, that we could not include in the analy-
sis for lack of adequate data. We accounted for some
of these aspects indirectly, through the institutional
background, and an open question for households
that did not take SM and/or APM. An overview of
the questions asked to elicit these variables, and any
transformation of variable levels, can be found in Ta-
ble S2 of the Supporting Information.
Most respondents (95%) specified no or only one
measure in each category of risk-reduction measures.
We thus coded the outcome variables to be binary
with 0 = no measure installed and 1 = one or more
measures installed. In the next section, we use de-
scriptive statistics to compare each variable across
countries. Due to the binary coding of our dependent
variables, we then use logistic regression analysis to
identify associations between risk-reduction behav-
ior and our predictors.
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Fig. 2. Overview of outcome and explanatory variables (mean and 95% confidence interval) by country. The respective numbers are sum-
marized in Table S3 in the Supporting Information.
5. RESULTS
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Fig. 2 compares the means and 95% confidence
intervals for all variables for the three countries. Due
to the binary nature of the variables, the mean equals
the proportion of observations with a positive out-
come. Fig. 2(a) shows that there was a significant dif-
ference in the number of households that have SMs
implemented versus those that have no measures
across Austria (45%), Romania (23%), and England
(19%). This difference was much less pronounced
for APMs, with 44%, 35%, and 38%, respectively
(Fig. 2b).
The share of households reporting to hold flood
insurance was generally high, but somewhat higher
among English households—65%, compared to
58% and 51% in Austria and Romania (Fig. 2c).
Thirty-seven percent of Austrian households re-
ported having received financial incentives or
material support for risk-reduction measures from
public authorities, compared to 26% in England and
15% in Romania (Fig 2d). In terms of awareness of
public information, England stood out with 58%,
compared to Austria (35%) and Romania (26%)
(Fig. 2e). Almost 70% of Austrian respondents felt
protected due to publicly provided flood protection
infrastructure, as do 45% of Romanian and 54% of
English respondents (Fig. 2f).
The share of respondents who perceived the like-
lihood of damages from floods to be from medium
to very high was much lower in England (25%)
than in Austria (41%) or Romania (42%) (Fig. 2h).
This difference was reflected in the share of house-
holds that had previously suffered damages from
floods: 23% in England, 53% in Austria, and 51% in
Romania (Fig. 2g).
Fig. 2(i) shows that our aim to reach mostly
homeowners was best achieved in Austria (93%) and
Romania (98%), and less so in England (75%).
5.1.1. Direct Public Incentives
We further explored public authorities at differ-
ent administrative levels as sources of support and
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Fig. 3. Different insurance mechanisms that may be positively associated with the implementation of risk-reduction measures. Means and
95% confidence intervals.
information. We acknowledge that our data reflect
the source only as perceived by respondents, which
may not be identical with the actual provider of the
incentive. The respondents report that most public
incentives, including financial, material, and infor-
mational support, originate from local authorities:
74% and 75% of all public incentives in Austria and
England, respectively, and 85% in Romania. For
the provision of information on risk-reduction mea-
sures, this means 68% of all information re-
ceived in Austria, 63% in Romania, and 61% in
England was perceived to originate from local au-
thorities. Respondents reported other public support
as being most often in-kind, and also received locally.
Few respondents reported public financial support
for the implementation of risk-reduction measures,
but, if so, it was reported more often in Austria than
in England or Romania.
5.1.2. Incentives from Insurers
With insured households we followed up on the
availability of certain incentives for risk reduction
that may be included in an insurance policy, in par-
ticular, deductibles, warranties, premium discounts,
and information on risk reduction (Fig. 3). Over 70%
of English, over 60% of Romanian, and about 50%
of Austrian respondents were aware of deductibles
in their insurance policies. Warranties and premium
discounts were mentioned by only a few percent
of respondents in all countries: Romania stands out
with more than 10% of respondents having had to
fulfill certain risk-reduction–related conditions in or-
der to purchase a flood insurance policy. About 30%
of Romanians also reported having received infor-
mation on risk-reduction measures from insurers.
Also in Austria, over 20% of respondents reported
such a service, whereas only about 5% of English re-
spondents did.
5.2. The Logistic Regression
We ran logistic regressions for SMs and APMs
independently, including the predictor variables de-
scribed in Fig. 1. A previous analysis had included
additional variables such as age, gender, income,
and education, as well as perceived responsibility for
flood protection and flood damages. We excluded
10 Hanger et al.
Fig. 4. Variables significantly associated with the implementation
of structural flood protection measures. Average marginal effects
and 95% confidence intervals.
these variables from the analysis here for a clearer
presentation of results, as we found no significant as-
sociations and no major increase in the significance
of the overall model. We acknowledge that our in-
come variable was barely insignificant for SMs. A
more differentiated analysis with respect to different
SMs might have rendered the variable more salient.
Figs. 4 and 5 summarize the average marginal
effects of the variables significantly associated with
risk-reduction behavior (the complete regression can
be found in Table S4 of the Supporting Information).
The low values for R2 and the small marginal effects
reflect the low explanatory power, despite the model
being significant overall. This is not unexpected, as
neither of the insurance and compensation schemes
investigated provide strong incentives and disincen-
tives for private flood risk mitigation.
Fig. 4 shows how Romanian and English respon-
dents are about 20% less likely to have SMs com-
pared to Austrian respondents. This result is robust,
accounting for the national differences in the other
variables. The difference between Romania and
England is only 3%. Fig. 4 also shows that insured
households were 6% more likely to have SMs in
place than uninsured households. Households that
had received public support ex ante were 7% more
likely to reduce their risks compared to households
that had not received such support.
Control variables significantly associated with
risk-reduction behavior are previous experience and
ownership; both increased the probability of having
implemented SMs by 10%.
Fig. 5 shows that the significant associations for
APMs were different from those for SMs. We find
that insurance increases the probability of house-
holds implementing APMs by 9%. Public support
and the provision of information were also positively
associated with having APMs in place at 9% and
11%, respectively. At the same time, public action
may be negatively associated with risk-reduction be-
havior, as feeling protected from floods because of
public protection infrastructure reduced the proba-
bility of having APMs in place by 8%. Unlike for
SMs, where risk perception was not influential, re-
spondents with a high perceived likelihood of dam-
ages were 15% more probable to have avoidance or
APMs implemented.
We investigated a subsample of households that
had previously experienced flood damage in Fig. 5,
indicated in gray, as the level of experience with
floods varied particularly for the English population
compared to the other countries. Also, a prelimi-
nary association analysis showed a strong correlation
of experience and risk perception (Table S5, Sup-
porting Information). The analysis of the subsample
shows howmitigation behavior with respect to APMs
is similar across countries; indeed, no significant dif-
ference can be found between England and Austria.
The difference in experience did not affect the re-
sults for SMs, and is therefore not included here. The
analysis of the subsample shows that there is an in-
dependent effect of risk perception on risk-reduction
behavior. Other variance of independent variables
across countries was tested using interaction terms,
and subsamples, and did neither increase model fit,
nor yield additional insights.
In order to determine the extent to which insur-
ers’ incentives are associated with risk-reduction be-
havior, we ran regressions on a subsample of only
insured households (Table S6, Supporting Informa-
tion). We found households were more likely to have
SMs in place if they also reported having received
any or several of the following incentives for risk
reduction from insurers: information on risk reduc-
tion, a premium discount for having implemented
risk-reduction measures, a warranty specifying cer-
tain risk reduction as a precondition. Being aware
of one’s deductibles made no difference in risk-
reduction behavior for SMs. This was the opposite
for APM, where a small, but positive, association
was established with deductibles, but not for other
incentives.
In order to assess the robustness of the regres-
sion model, as well as to gain insight on associa-
tions at the country levels, we ran the logistic re-
gression for each of the country samples (Table S7,
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Fig. 5. Variables significantly associated with the implementation of APMs: average marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals. In gray
is the analysis repeated only for households reported to have experienced flood damage before.
Supporting Information). We found that the regres-
sion model using SMs as the dependent variable was
only significant in Austria and England, but not for
Romania, whereas the model for APMs was signifi-
cant for all three countries. The variables related to
public and private incentives and the indirect effects
of large-scale flood protection were not significant for
Romania. Other differences to the main sample are
the fact that feeling protected was indeed weakly,
but positively, associated with the implementation of
SMs in Austria. This finding is somewhat surprising.
It indicates that Austrians who feel protected from
floods are somewhat more likely to have structural
measures in place. We can only speculate about the
reasons for this: it might have to do with the fact
that the SMs implemented predate the public protec-
tion infrastructure. Finally, in the English case, public
support was not associated with the implementation
of APMs.
5.3. Other Drivers of Risk-Reduction Behavior
We acknowledge that in the absence of strong
public and private incentives there are other drivers
that play an important role in determining risk-
reduction behavior (see Fig. 1). Although resource
constraints did not allow for a detailed analysis, we
are able to provide some context based on an open-
ended question on the reasons for not taking any
measures, which we asked those households that had
no measures implemented. While around 50% of re-
spondents in this subsample did not have SMs and/or
APMs in place due to low risk perception, 15% ar-
gued that high costs were the reason for not tak-
ing private risk-reduction measures. More than 70%
of Romanian respondents considered risk-reduction
measures to be too expensive. Eleven percent of re-
spondents expressed the view that the implementa-
tion of any measure was too complicated or that they
lacked the necessary knowledge to make the right
decision. In less than 5% of responses, the blame
landed on insurance, public protection, and lack of
time; less than 1% gave public compensation as a
reason for not taking measures. These findings high-
light that apart from risk perception, coping appraisal
indeed seems to be an important consideration in
many households in the absence of stronger incen-
tives from public authorities and insurers.
6. DISCUSSION
Our data yield important insights conducive to
designing and reforming flood risk management with
the aim to increase their potential to enhance private
risk reduction. Here, we discuss them first for insur-
ance, and then for public incentives resulting from
different aspects of risk management more broadly.
We found no support for moral hazard in in-
sured households. Indeed, households holding flood
insurance were somewhat more likely to have risk-
reduction measures in their homes. This is in line
with findings by Thieken et al. and Osberghaus for
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Germany(28,52) and Hudson et al. for Germany and
the United States.(24) While we could not associate
deductibles with the implementation of SMs, which
corresponds with findings for hurricane insurance in
the United States,(24) warranties, premium discounts,
or information on risk reduction were positively as-
sociated. This is the opposite for APMs, where de-
ductibles are positively associated with APMS, but
not warranties, premium discounts, or information
on risk reduction. In practice, it is these mechanisms
that are rarely part of insurance policies.
Our data suggest that Austrians, who have par-
tial postdisaster relief at their disposal, are more
(SMs) or equally (APMs) protective of their homes
than Romanians and the English. If there is charity
hazard, it seems not to be salient and strong enough
to overcome other drivers of risk reduction. One pos-
sible explanation for this could also be the tendency
in Austria to build one’s own home rather than buy
professionally developed homes, which is more com-
mon in England and Romania. This would make it
easier to implement structural measures from the be-
ginning, and/or explain the fact that Austrians are
more aware of the measures implemented. Another
reason could be that in Austria, compared to Ro-
mania and England, more ex ante incentives for risk
reduction-financial and in-kind—are available.
Dominant flows of this kind of public support
and information were local, and positively associated
with private risk-reduction behavior, particularly for
APMs. This was strongest in England, and in line
with other research findings for France,(5) but with
contradicting findings for Italy.(30) Compared to in-
surers’ incentives, both financial and in terms of in-
formation, public incentives were mentioned more
frequently in the survey, and showed a stronger asso-
ciation with risk-reduction behavior. However, over-
all, also households that reported having public ex
ante incentives received, particularly financial ones,
were rare.
According to our data, public flood protection
creates a feeling of safety, which was negatively asso-
ciated both with risk perception and risk-reduction
behavior. The country analysis reveals that this is
true for Austria, and England individually in the case
of APMs. The association was strongest in Austria,
where it was also significant for SMs. This means
that a significant number of respondents who are
protected by public measures such as flood dams
actually feel safer and thus tend to invest less in
property-level prevention. This could be seen as a ra-
tional behavior, but it can become problematic if the
perception of safety is overstated. Such a “false sense
of security” may inadvertently increase the chance of
flood damage due to an underinvestment in private
measures. Considering the potential effectiveness
of local provision of information, we consider more
targeted awareness raising in the catchment of
large-scale flood protection through local channels a
useful task for public authorities and insurers.
Some of these overall associations cannot be re-
produced for the Romanian case by itself. For Ro-
mania neither public nor private incentives were
significantly associated with private risk-reduction
behavior. The reasons may be related to insufficient
effort and enforcement on the side of public author-
ities and insurers, or to a lack of trust and reliance
in the population toward the support provided.(53)
Other behavioral drivers related to coping capacity
may thus be more relevant and warrant further in-
vestigation.
We excluded the effect of latent variables and
mediated effects, which are likely to exist and de-
serve further attention. This provides room for ad-
ditional research. Future work could also address the
need for better integrating behavioral, cognitive, and
institutional drivers, and the distribution of burdens
and benefits between households and private and
public actors. Furthermore, we did not explore in-
advertent effects that may be caused by other public
risk management efforts, such as efficient postdisas-
ter help and rescue efforts, and social capital.(54)
In summary, we can say that insurers’ incentives
for risk reduction are even less common than public
efforts to improve property-level risk reduction.
However, if available these incentives were posi-
tively associated with risk-reduction behavior at the
household level. This means that both insurers and
public authorities have ample room to improve their
policies on that account. Our model does not show
any negative effects for risk reduction from charity
hazard. In the light of existing economic theory this
is somewhat surprising, and given the limitations
of our study, should be interpreted with caution.
Further work would be required to investigate
the relationship between public ex post assistance
and private risk-reduction efforts in more detail.
As they stand, our findings suggest that completely
abolishing public ex post disaster aid, which is
politically difficult, might not always be an essential
ingredient for strengthening private actions of house-
holds to reduce flood losses. Considering the costs
and difficulties associated with comprehensive risk-
based pricing in insurance practice, it may be worth
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considering different avenues of incentivizing risk
reduction at the household level, such as local
information campaigns, stricter spatial planning, and
building regulations.
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